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Abstract—Contemporary Epidemiological Surveillance
(ES) relies heavily on data analytics. These analytics
are critical input for pandemics preparedness networks;
however, this input is not integrated into a form suitable
for decision makers or experts in preparedness. A decision
support system (DSS) with Computational Intelligence (CI)
tools is required to bridge the gap between epidemiological
model of evidence and expert group decision. We argue
that such DSS shall be a cognitive dynamic system enabling
the CI and human expert to work together. The core of
such DSS must be based on machine reasoning techniques
such as probabilistic inference, and shall be capable of
estimating risks, reliability and biases in decision making.
Keywords: Epidemiological surveillance, prepared-
ness network, decision support, probabilistic reasoning,
risk, AI reliability, bias.
I. INTRODUCTION
World Health Organization distinguishes five levels of
strategic preparedness for pandemic outbreak [1]:
1) Community Transmission,
2) Local Transmission,
3) Imported cases,
4) High risk of imported cases,
5) Preparedness.
The entity that monitors, reports and develops the
policies and strategies to prepare for response is usu-
ally called a Preparedness network. An example of
at attempts to create such infrastructure was a project
called the European S-HELP (Securing-Health Emer-
gency Learning Planning, 2014-2017), which, however,
was not reported to be materialized into a functioning
system.
Epidemiological Surveillance (ES) is a part of any
local, national or global epidemic preparedness net-
work such as the Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System (GISRS) [2], the Communicable Dis-
eases Network Australia (CDNA) and the Common-
wealths National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance Sys-
tem (NNDSS). The ES has means to assess a state
of epidemic threat in order to introduce suitable coun-
termeasures. In GISRS, for example, the public health
decision-making is based on assessing pandemic severity
and transmissibility score as guided by Pandemic Sever-
ity Assessment Framework [3]. Early in a pandemic,
when limited data are available, scores are rated as low-
moderate or moderate-high. As additional data become
available, transmissibility is assigned a value within a
range of 15, and severity is varied within the range 17.
These characterize the potential pandemic impact in re-
lation to previous pandemics or seasonal epidemics. The
further assessment of impact on response and mitigation
of an emerging pandemic is not generally supported by
any Computational Intelligence (CI) tool.
In biostatistics, various ES models have been de-
veloped and used by statisticians and epidemiologists.
However, they generally are not being translated in the
practice of preparedness for pandemic. The ES models
can predict the pandemics mortality and morbidity, but
do not account for multiple variables and uncertainties
such as reliability of surveyed data or credibility of sur-
vey or testing technology. they are not directly presented
in the form that enables its use in pandemics response
or mitigation.
It is known that pandemics assessment “depends on
rapid availability of treatment, clinical support, and
vaccines” [3], and those variables are not taken into
account in the known statistical ES models. Some ES
models can be “stratified” for age, gender of other
variables, but does not provide any causal analysis. In
other words, no decision support tool, that would provide
meta-analysis and assess risks in preparedness context,
is readily available.
COVID-19 outbreak unveiled critical disadvantages
of the existing ES model and in providing support
for preparedness systems. Important lessons learnt from
these failures are as follows:
1) Outcomes of the ES models need to be further
translated to become usable.
2) Experts and PN management teams require com-
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Fig. 1. Contemporary ES practice: the result of the epidemic or pandemic modeling, which is based on current evidence and most of the
time ignores multiple variable influencing the predictions, is provided directly to the human users, or a group of experts. This output does
not usually include the results of new knowledge inference, or reasoning, to help experts to cope with abundance of data and uncertainty,
and project them into the usable measures as risk or bias
putational intelligence (CI) support in decision-
making process that is ported into the ES model.
At a system level, these disadvantages manifest them-
selves as a technology gap, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In terms of a community, city or country preparedness
as a whole, much more factors come into considera-
tion in order to implement epidemic preparedness. An
Epidemic Preparedness Index (EPI) developed in [4]
includes 23 indicators grouped into five sub-indexes:
1) Public Health Infrastructure,
2) Physical Infrastructure,
3) Institutional Capacity,
4) Economic Resources,
5) Public Health Communication.
This rating measures the national-level preparedness for
major outbreaks of infectious diseases, based on various
factors related to the healthcare system.
A DSS to be used in Epidemic Preparedness system at
community, city or country-level shall include a system
of DSSs, each takes into account the support to the
experts that manage various community infrastructures
and resources such as the ones listed in [4]
This approach is based on the concept of group
decision making [53], [54] that is illustrated in Fig.
2. Given an evidence and N experts, each of them is
supported by the DSS; the task to support experts in
group decision-making.
We state that each expert needs a specific-purpose
DSS related to their respected field of expertise. Given
data from the epidemiological model, the output of each
DSS is a result of a dynamic evidential reasoning. The
general principles of building such DSS, as outlined in
this paper, shall be applied to build the aforementioned
hierarchy of DSSs for better managing future epidemics
and pandemics.
II. CONTRIBUTION
Uncertainties in developing epidemic/pandemic is
equally unavoidable; hence, experts require a CI tool that
accounts for uncertainty. The answer lies in usage of
probabilistic reasoning, namely, causal (Bayesian) net-
works operating using probabilities and enabling knowl-
edge inference based on priors and evidence [5]. This
approach has been applied to risk assessment in multiple
areas of engineering and economics [56], risk profiling
[7], identity management [8], precision medicine diag-
nostics [28] and very recently to analysis of COVID-19
risks such as fatality and prevalence rates [57].
This paper advocates for a concept of a Decision
Support System (DSS) for ES, with a CI core based on
causal Bayesian networks. We define a DSS as a crucial
bridging component to be integrated into the existing ES
systems in order to provide situational awareness and
help handle the outbreaks better.
The DSS concept has been developed for multiple
applications, and were once known as “expert systems”.
For example, paper [9] is still a useful guide for training
experts and DSS design, e.g. automation of reasoning
and interpretation strategies is the way to extend experts’
abilities to apply their own strategies efficiently.
Specific-centered DSS is a well-identified trend in
using the CI in many fields including the ES. Examples
of contemporary DSS are personal health monitoring
systems [10], e-coaching for health [11], security check-
points [12], [13], and multi-factor authentication systems
[14].
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Fig. 2. A framework of the DSS emerging applications: human-machine teaming using DSS. Final decision is the consensus of expert’s
decisions supported by consensus of DSS.
Usability of CI tools to support a team of practitioners
with or without technical background should be esti-
mated using various measures compared to the decision
making tools performance. Risk, reliability, trust and bias
are emerging “precaution” measures for the cognitive
DSS. The performance of the cognitive DSS is evaluated
in various dimensions:
− Technical, e.g. prediction accuracy and throughput
[14],
− Social, e.g. trust in CI’s reliability [16], [17],
− Psychological, e.g., efficiency of human-machine
interactions [18], [19], and
− Privacy and security domain, e.g., vulnerability of
personal data [13], [15], [20], [21].
In our study, we model the DSS as a complex multi-
state dynamic system [13]. The risk assessment is an
essential part of such a system [8]. The crucial idea of
our approach is that risk, reliability, trust and bias should
be estimated using reasoning mechanisms.
Some of the risk, reliability and trust projections have
been studied in technical systems [15], [23] and social
systems [31].
Failure of the existing ES to provide proper COVID-
19 outbreak modeling and prediction for preparedness
infrastructure revealed significant gaps in the existing
concept, design, deployment, and collaboration of the
national and international preparedness networks. In this
study, we identify a technological gap in the ES in both
technical and conceptual domains (Fig. 1). Conceptually,
the ES users require a significant cognitive support using
a distributed computational intelligence tools. This paper
addresses the key research question: How to bridge this
gap using the DSS concept?
To answer this question, we have chosen the model
of a DSS called a dynamic cognitive platform. We
follow a well-identified trend in academic discussion on
the future generation DSS [27]. Unfortunately, this is an
important but partial solution.
This paper make further steps and contributes to prac-
tice of technology gap bridging. The key contribution is
twofold:
1) Development of a reasoning and prediction
mechanism, – the core of a DSS; for this, a
concept of a Bayesian causal network [6] is used;
in particular, recent real-world scenario of COVID-
19 was described using a Bayesian network [57].
2) Development of a complete spectrum of the
risk and bias measures, including ES taxonomy
updating.
These results are coherent with the solutions to the
following related problems:
− The technology gap “pillars” in Fig. 1 are Protocol
of the ES model and Protocol of DSS. These
protocols are different, e.g. spread virus behavior
and conditions of small business operation. The
task is to convert the ES protocol into a DSS
specification. Criteria of efficiency of conversion
are an acceptance of a given field expert. Rea-
soning mechanism based on causal network in-
trinsically contains the protocol conversion. We
demonstrate this phenomenon in our experiments.
− The DSS supports an expert to make decisions
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under uncertainty in a specific field of an exper-
tise. Specifically, intelligent computations help an
expert in better interpretation of uncertainty under
chosen precautions. The risk and bias are used in
this paper as a precautions of different kind of
uncertainties related to ES data [24], testing tools,
human factors, ES model turning parameters, and
artificial intelligent.
− Standardization at all levels of the ES of pre-
paredness network including the international links
is essential in combating epidemic and pandemics.
For example, different formats (protocols, stan-
dards) are defined as a significant obstacle in
Covid-19 pandemic [55]. An example of taxonomy
of information uncertainty in military situational
awareness is an Admiralty Code used in NATO
standard. We propose to use NATO experience in
this area for the pandemics preparedness purposes.
A DSS concept suitable for the ES model is proposed
in this paper.
III. BACKGROUND
In the face of future pandemics, challenging problems
in preparedness include:
1) Improvement of the models in order to provide
more reliable recommendations that are acceptable for
real-world scenarios, and
2) Mitigation of the incorrectness of pandemic models
in the decision-making response.
We advocate for a solution that utilizes the foremost
machine intelligence techniques called machine reason-
ing (knowledge extraction and inference mechanism)
that would provide information support to the decision
makers.
A. Risk taxonomy
A cognitive DSS is a semi-automated system, which
deploys CI to process the data sources and to assess
risks or biases; this assessment is submitted to a human
operator for the final decision.
The risk, reliability, trust and bias measures are used
in ES in simple forms such as ‘high-risk group’, ‘risk
factor’, and ‘systematic difference in the enrollment of
participants’ [24]. However, experts expect from the
cognitive DSS more detailed assessments of epidemic
scenarios because the corpus of risk terms and definitions
is limited. For example, syndrome surveillance consists
of real-time indicators for disease that allow for early
detection. The DSS must support an expert with answers
to the following questions: How risky a given state of
ES with respect to collapse of health care resources?
Can experts rely on the collected data? What kind of
biases can be expected in data collection, algorithmic
processing, and the decision making?
Definition 1: Risk is a measure of the extent to which
an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or
event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse
impact, also called cost or magnitude of harm, that
would arise if the circumstance or event occurs, and (ii)
the likelihood of event occurrence [32]. 
For example, in automated decision making, and in our
study, the Risk is defined as a function F of cost
(or consequences) of a circumstance or event and its
occurrence probability:
Risk = F (Cost, Probability)
Definition 2: Bias in the cognitive DSS refers to
the tendency of an assessment process to systematically
over- or under-estimate the value of a population param-
eter. 
For example, in the context of detecting or testing for
an infectious disease, the bias is related to the sampling
approaches (e.g. tests are performed on a proportion of
cases only), sampling methodology (systemic or ran-
dom), and chosen testing procedures or devices [25].
While all these biases are different, they are proba-
bilistic in nature because the evidence and information
gathered to make a decision is always incomplete, often
inconclusive, frequently ambiguous, commonly disso-
nant, conflicting, and has various degrees of believability.
Identifying and mitigating bias is essential for assessing
decision risks and AI biases [16], [26], [27].
For the cognitive DSS to operate effectively on the
human’s behalf, the system may need to use confi-
dential or sensitive information of the users such as
personal contact information [37]. The users and the
operators must be confident that the cognitive DSS will
do what they ask, and only what they ask. Human
acceptance of the cognitive DSS technology is deter-
mined by the combination of the bias factors and risk
factors [22], [23]. The contributing factors include belief,
confidence, experience, certainty, reliability, availability,
competence, credibility, completeness, and cooperation
[38], [39]. In our approach, the causal inference platform
calculates various uncertainty measures [7] in risk and
bias assessment scenarios.
B. Risk and Decision Reliability interpretation
Risk in decision making process manifests itself in
various ways, such as the reliability of information
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sources (e.g. infection survey data) and the credibility
of the information (e.g. testing procedure accuracy):
Data Reliability︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality
⇔
 RiskTrustBias
⇔ Test Credibility︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reputation
This relationship can be represented as follows:
(a) Source reliability as the quality of being reliable,
or trustworthy, is related to 1) risk as a function
of potential adverse impact and the likelihood of
occurrence, 2) the confidence in quality, and 3)
bias as systematic over- or under-assessment of the
parameter of interest.
(b) Information credibility as the reputation impacting
one’s ability to be believed. In ES, in particular, it
can be associated with the credibility of infection
testing technology.
These metrics of uncertainty closely resemble the
ones known as the Admiralty Code defined in the
NATO Standardization Agreements such as STANAG
2022 and STANAG 2511 [33]–[35] (Fig. 3). NATO uses
the Admiralty Code to resolve conflicting scenarios in
human-human, human-machine, and machine-machine
interactions. The reliability of the DSS can be increased
by using more reliable sources and creditable informa-
tion, or it can be diminished due to lowered reliabil-
ity of the source or/and credibility of the information.
For example, scenario C4 in Figure 3 is composed
as the source reliability C≡ <Fairly Reliable>
and information credibility 4≡ <Doubtful true>.
In this context, risk can be expressed in terms of the fair
reliability of data sources while doubtful credibility of
information.
In this study, we argue that similar standards shall
be developed in the ES practice. Definition of measure
of uncertainty in the ES will allow to formalize the
reasoning upon uncertainty, and define the variables
to be included in causal networks, and the associated
probabilities. In addition, various scenarios developing
in epidemic situations, can be characterized by various
levels of uncertainty.
Fig. 4 explains the DSS mechanism for assessing
different scenarios that are called the system states. For
example, consider the states {S1, S2, . . . , S12} of the
ES. The DSS analysis accordingly to the Admiralty
Code (Figure 3) results in the following decision-making
landscape:
− States S1 and S9; S2 and S7; S3, S4, and S5 can be used
for decision-making;
− States S10; S6 and S11; and S12 results in high-risk deci-
sions.
IV. COGNITIVE DSS FOR ES
Decision making by human experts vary in knowledge
structure, self-interest and growth background, thus the
emergence of preference conflict is inevitable. In order to
ensure the effectiveness of emergency decision making
support, it is imperative to construct a consensus process
to reduce and remove preference conflict prior to deci-
sion making. This process aligns well with the concept
of cognitive DSS.
A. Elements of a cognitive system
A cognitive DSS for ES support is a complex dynamic
system with the following elements of a cognitive system
[29]:
Perception-action cycle that enables information gain
[30];
Memory distributed across the entire system (personal
data are collected in the physical and virtual
world);
Attention is driven by memory to prioritize the alloca-
tion of available resources; and
Intelligence is driven by perception, memories, and
attention; its function is to enable the control
and decision-making mechanism to help identify
intelligent choices. These cognitive elements are
distributed throughout the system in a multi-state
perception-action cycle [8], [13].
In most generic sense, the perception-action cycle of
a cognitive dynamic system consists of an actuator, an
environment, and a perceptor that are embodied in a
feedback loop [29]:
− The actuator is represented by expert team and
their DSS; they make decisions and actions using
available perceived information.
− The environment is represented by an epidemiolog-
ical evidence (real or modeled).
B. DSS Design Flow
The DSS design process including performance eval-
uation is shown in
Figure 5. The important parts of this process include
system “precaution” measurement of the models used
for measurement of uncertainty, as well as the DSS
precaution measurement in terms of risks and biases with
respect to the recommended decisions.
C. Fundamental DSS operations
In our work, given a certain causal network platform,
the reasoning operations are defined as follows:
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Fig. 3. Manifestation of the R-T-B via assessments of reliability of source and credibility of information using the Admiralty Code.
S = S1, S2, . . . , S12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Initial system states
=⇒

1 2 3 4 5 6
A S2,7
B
C S1,9 S3,4,5
D
E S10 S6,11
F S12

︸ ︷︷ ︸
The R-T-B reasoning (Admiralty Code)
=⇒ S(C1)1,9 ;S(A2)2,7 ;S(C4)3,4,5;
Risky states︷ ︸︸ ︷
S
(E2)
10 S
(E6)
6,11 ;S
(F5)
12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assessed states for decision-making
Fig. 4. Example of the risk assessment of the epidemic situation. Let the ES be represented by a set of a system states S = Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , 12.
The DSS primary task is the risk reasoning about these states using available resources defined using the Admiralty code (Table ??). The
result is a set of system states provided to the experts to support their decision making.
1) State assessment, such as the risk of the data source
being unreliable. In modeling, risk is represented by a
corresponding probability distribution function.
2) Causal analysis is based on the “cause-effect”
paradigm. In particular, Granger causality analysis is an
advanced tool for this purpose [47].
3) Risk reliability, trust and bias learning. In [48], an
approach to learning the trust model has been proposed.
4) Risk, trust and bias propagation. The risk prop-
agation problem was studied, in particular, as a multi-
echelon supply chain problem in [52]. In [49], the trust-
worthiness is propagated through a three-layer model
consisting of a source layer, evidence layer, and claim
layer. The quality of evidence was used to compute
the trustworthiness of sources. Trust can be propagated
through a subjective network [36].
5) Reasoning is the ability to form an intelligent
conclusion or judgment using the evidence. Causal rea-
soning is a judgment under uncertainty based on a causal
network [5].
6) Risk, reliability, trust and bias adjustment (or
calibration) aims to improve the confidence of the risk
assessment. For example, negative testing in a symp-
tomatic patient may result in a high risk indicator, but
can be later adjusted using additional testing.
7) Risk, reliability, trust and bias mitigation. In most
scenarios, the result of intelligent risk processing is a
reduction in risk. Risk is lowered via mitigation mea-
sures and periodical re-assessment in ongoing screening
processes.
8) Risk prediction. In complex systems, meta-
recognition, meta-learning, and meta-analysis can be
used to predict the overall success (correct assessment
of the risk) or failure (incorrect one). The most valuable
information for such risk assessment is in the “tails” of
the probabilistic distributions [50], [51].
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Fig. 5. DSS design flow: the data is collected in order to extract knowledge about causality of variables, and convert the uncertainty of data
into the Conditional probabilities assigned to the nodes of the casual model; the probabilities are assigned using the procedure of interpreting
the discrete values (such as symptomatic or asymptomatic), and discretization of continuous values such as distribution of the numbers of
infected based on the modified SIR models.
V. REASONING MECHANISM
A. Causal network
A causal network is a directed acyclic graph where
each node denotes a unique random variable. A directed
edge from node n1 to node n2 indicates that the value
that is attained by n1 has a direct causal influence on
the value that is attained by n2. Uncertainty inference
requires data structures that will be referred to as Con-
ditional Uncertainty Tables (CUTs). A CUT is assigned
to each node in the causal network. Given a node n,
the CUT assigned to n is a table that is indexed by
all possible value assignments to the parents of n. Each
entry of the table is a conditional “uncertainty model”
that varies according to the choice of the uncertainty
metric.
Analysis of a causal network is out of the scope of this
paper. However, we introduce in this paper the systematic
criteria for choosing the appropriate computational tools.
In addition, some details are clarified in our experimental
study.
B. Types of causal networks
Thee are multiple approaches to perform case-and-
effect analysis under uncertainty using the causal net-
work structure. Depending on the type of uncertainty
measure, they causal networks can be divided to [45]:
Bayesian [5], Interval [41]; Imprecise [40]; Credal
[42]; Dempster-Shafer [43]; Fuzzy [44]; and Subjective
[36].
The type of a causal network shall be chosen given
the DSS model and a specific scenario. The choice
depends on the CUT as a carrier of primary knowledge
and as appropriate to the scenario. There were several
attempts to provide researchers with the “Guidelines”
for choosing the best causal network platform based on
the CUT. Comparison of causal computational platforms
for modeling various systems is a useful strategy, such as
Dempster-Shafer vs. credal networks [46], and Bayesian
vs. interval vs. Dempster-Shafer vs. fuzzy networks [7],
[8].
C. Bayesian causal network
Motivation of choosing Bayesian causal networks is
driven by the following:
− a DSS can be described in causal form using cause-
and-effect analysis.
− Bayesian (probabilistic) interpretation of uncer-
tainty provides an acceptable reliability for
decision-making.
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The Bayesian decision-making is based on evaluation
of a prior probability given a posterior probability
and likelihood (event happening given some history of
previous events)
Prior︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Hypothesis|Data) =
Likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Data|Hypothesis)×
Posterior︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Hypothesis)
Let the nodes of a graph represent random variables
X = {x1, . . . , xm} and links between the nodes rep-
resent direct causal dependencies. A Bayesian causal
network is based on a factored representation of joint
probability distributions in the form
P (X) =
Factorization︷ ︸︸ ︷
m∏
i=1
P (xi|
Nodes︷ ︸︸ ︷
Par(xi))
where Par(xi) denotes a set of parent nodes of the
random variable xi. The nodes outside Par(xi) are
conditionally independent of xi. Hence, the Bayesian
network has a structural part reflecting causal relation-
ships, and a probability part reflecting the strengths of
the relationships. Factoring techniques have been applied
to the construction of the Bayesian network.
The posterior probability of A is called the belief
for A, Bel(A). The probability P (a|b) is called the
likelihood of b given a and is denoted L(b|a).
D. Reasoning for infection outbreak and impact predic-
tion
The presence of epidemic/pandemic uncertainties is
equally unavoidable; hence, experts require a CI ap-
proach that accounts for uncertainty. Probabilistic rea-
soning on causal (Bayesian) networks enables knowledge
inference based on priors and evidence has been applied
to diagnostics for precision medicine [28].
Most recently, COVID-19 test-specific risk analysis
was performed in [57]: the Bayesian inference was
applied to learn the proportion of population with or
without symptoms from observations of those tested
along with observations about testing accuracy.
An example of a simplified causal network that can
serve as a framework for risk inference in the context of
preparedness is shown in Figure 6. The factors affecting
the risk can be evaluated and inferred for various con-
sidered scenario. The derivatives such as Preparedness
Index can be derived in a similar fashion.
Note that this is only a fragment of a causal network
that may be used in the DSS to assess risks related
to outbreak itself. A DSS to be used in Epidemic
Preparedness system shall include a system of DSSs.
Each expert needs a specific-purpose DSS related to
their respected field of expertise. Given data from the
epidemiological model, the output of each DSS is a result
of a dynamic evidential reasoning. The general principles
of building such DSS, as outlined in this paper, shall be
applied to build the aforementioned hierarchy of DSSs
for better managing future epidemics and pandemics.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As depicted in Figure 1, there is a technology gap
between the imperfect ES model and human expert’s
limitations to handle uncertainty provided by the model
while striving to make reliable decisions. Current efforts
regarding epidemiological models focus on the follow-
ing:
− Increase information gain about the state of epi-
demiological threat using perception-action mecha-
nisms.
− Improve an approximation of joint probabilistic
distributions of epidemiological factors; causal net-
works suggest such possibilities including proactive
possibilities.
− Create a library of predictive behavior of virus
based on genome studies and deep learning methods
[59].
We propose a general DSS model as a cognitive
dynamical system with embedded reasoning mechanism
using causal Bayesian network. Additional benefit of
this approach is that there is no need in special tools
for converting outcome of the model into recommended
decisions.
An open applied problem addresses a “rational”
partitioning of the model outcome into an ensemble
of causal networks. This is because in a preparedness
network, a group of experts from different fields aim to
make a decision and come to a certain consensus. Each
expert needs a decision support in the respective area
such as transportation, hospital readiness, health care,
educational institutions, police, counter cyber attack,
counter bioterrorism, etc. The DSS and human expert’s
decisions are in causal relations, they are correlated, and
conflicting. This is the field of a group decision making
[53], [54], [58].
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Fig. 6. A simplified causal network used in the core of the DSS for epidemic preparedness. The nodes represent the variables influencing
the decision about the risk of outbreak.
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